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The decision to purchase a home is one of the most important financial decisions made by 
young adults today. This decision is influenced by several factors including the 
individual's demographics and family characteristics. The purpose of this study is to focus 
on the influence of these factors on the probability of home ownership for young adults. 
Recent changes in the economy and society call for the reevaluation of the 
determinants of home ownership. In essence, the impact of these determinants has 
fluctuated with the economy. Joseph Gyourko and Peter Linneman (1996) suggest some 
trends. According to them, marital status remains important to the home ownership 
decision, though its effect has weakened. The impact of the level of education is now just 
as important as the presence of children in a household. Also, first-time buyers are 
increasing in age as well as income levels. This is most likely reflecting the steep increases 
in the real cost of"affordable housing." One factor that has remained the same is the 
impact of race. No matter what the level of progress of minorities in society, 
economically, many remain below the wealth constraint for home ownership (1996). 
The purpose of this research is to test family income, race, gender, educational 
attainment, parental home ownership, age, marital status and family size as determinants of 
home ownership. This paper differs from past research in that it applies human capital 
investment theory to the home ownership decision. Section II explores the human capital 
investment theory and adapts it to the home ownership model. Section III provides the 
research design for this project and section IV develops the empirical model. Section V 
interprets the results while section VI summarizes the paper and provides concluding 
remarks. 
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II. THEORY 
Human capital investment theory is based on the idea that any activity that increases the 
productivity of labor may be considered as investment in human capital. This theory 
involves determining the present value of cost and benefit streams associated with 
investment. This investment includes expenditures on education, training and retraining. 
One characteristic of investment is that current costs are incurred with the expectation of 
future returns. In terms of human capital, individuals make expenditures on education and 
training thereby enhancing their knowledge and skills. This leads to an increase in future 
earnings. Similarly, an individual incurs initial costs through a home purchase in 
anticipation ofbenefits (such as equity) in the future. The primary point is that 
expenditures on education and training are understood as an investment in human capital 
just as expenditures in housing can be treated as an investment in housing capital. 
The next section adapts human capital investment theory to the home ownership 
decision. It follows the human capital investment theory as outlined by Campbell R. 
McConnell and Stanley L. Brue in Contemporary Labor Economics. 
The Home Ownership Model 
The model for home ownership is similar to that for human capital. First of all, there are 
costs associated with housing investment, primarily in the first year of ownership. These 
costs are directly related to the purchase of a house and include a downpayment, mortgage 
payments, an insurance policy and special fees including closing and attorney costs. A few 
costs, such as taxes and maintenance, occur every year during the ownership lifetime. 
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There are also benefits associated with this model. Benefits of home ownership include 
such aspects as space (several rooms and a yard) and more importantly, the pride ofhome 
ownership. Another thing to consider in the home ownership model is the role of equity at 
the end of the ownership life. Equity is strictly 
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associated with home ownership and not rental properties. At the end of his ownership 
life an individual has a major asset, namely a house, through which he may realize capital 
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gains as well as other benefits. Essentially, all costs that are incurred through the purchase 
of the house may be returned through its sale. 
Graphically, this model is interpreted in Figure 1. A potential benefits stream is 
indicated by curve RR, where a person has decided to rent over the course of his 
ownership life. This curve is net of costs which means both costs and benefits are depicted 
by RR. Benefits associated with renting include warmth, protection from the elements and 
convenience. Convenience concerns maintenance issues and the fact that a renter does not 
have to pay for repairs or upkeep of the property. Costs of renting are rental payments, 
utility costs and restrictions on living conditions. 
Curve lUI represents the net benefit stream associated with a housing purchase. 
The first leg of the lUI curve represents the costs, or negative benefits, incurred during the 
first year ofhome ownership. These costs include the downpayment, closing costs and 
attorney fees and are generally greater than the benefits during this year. The middle 
section of the lUI curve is the net benefits incurred over the ownership life. It is important 
to understand the meaning ofnet benefits. It is the flow of services obtained through 
home ownership such as shelter, warmth, plenty ofliving space and future equity 
considering the associated costs. The costs ofhome ownership include factors such as 
mortgage and insurance and utility payments, property taxes and maintenance costs. 
These costs, depending on the length of the ownership life, generally occur every year. 
Since this curve takes into account both services (benefits) and costs realized through the 
home ownership life, it is a net benefit curve. The final leg oflUI is the equity received at 
the end of the ownership life. The costs incurred during this year are generally minimal 
compared to the equity received. Given the costs ofhome ownership, high income 
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suggest that large families have a higher need for home ownership. 
Area 1 designated below the RR curve and above the HH curve during the first 
year represents the initial cost accrued through home ownership. The initial cost is the 
total investment in the purchase of a home. The difference between curves RR and HH 
(Area 2) represents the additional net benefits a homeowner will realize over the course of 
his ownership life compared to those of a renter. 
Net Present Value and the Decision Rule 
A rational homebuyer bases the home ownership decision on a comparison of costs and 
benefits. Since costs and benefits accrue at different points of time, they must be 
compared at a common point of time. Therefore, the net present value of the present and 
future costs and benefits of home ownership need to be determined. In order to do so, the 
concept of time preference must be considered. Time preference can be viewed as 
preference of present consumption over future consumption. Basically, time preference 
takes into account the fact that people are impatient and prefer a basket ofgoods in the 
present over the same basket in the future (prefer the costs and benefits in the present 
rather than those associated with the future). Today's dollars are worth less than those of 
next year or several years from now due to the interest rate associated with borrowing 
dollars. Consequently, an interest payment is necessary to defer present consumption to 
the future. 
Home ownership also includes risk. Risk associated with home ownership includes 
various events, economic and otherwise, including unexpected depreciation ofvalue or a 
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catastrophic loss. Therefore, when specifically discussing the present value of home 
ownership, the discount rate will include a component (r) which will account for risk. 
Due to the previous reasoning and the fact that a future dollar is worth less than 
today's dollar, the preference for present consumption requires a positive interest rate. 
Essentially, a dollar today can be loaned or invested at a certain interest rate and be worth 
more than a dollar a year from now. Algebraically, this is: 
where Vp = present value 
VI = value 1 year from now 
i = interest rate 
r = risk factor 
Rather than determining the future value of a present dollar, it is important in this 
study to determine the present value ofa future dollar. This is portrayed in the discount 
formula: 
However, this study is comparing the costs and benefits over several years which 
results in an extension of the discount formula. Thus, applied to home ownership: 
Vp = Bo+B/(l + i + r) +B2/(1 + i + ri +B3/(1 + i + r)3 + ... +BT/(l + i + r)T 
+Expected Equity in T/(l + i + r)T 
where B = stream ofnet incremental benefits 
B1 = additional benefits received the next year, etc. 
T = duration (years) ofbenefits stream over ownership life 
i = interest rate 
r = risk factor 
The immediate incremental benefits (or costs) incurred, Bo, are not discounted. 
However, the incremental benefits incurred the following year, B1, must be discounted by 
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one year. Observe that the power of each successive denominator is equivalent to the 
number ofyears that benefit stream must be discounted to determine its present value. 
Therefore, the equation may be restated as: 
Vp = L B1 / (1 + i + ry+ Expected Equity in T/(1 + i + rl 
1=0 
~his equation simply states the present value of the sum of the discounted incremental 
benefits over an individual's ownership life. The ownership life is indicated by the range 
of t from 0 to z where 0 is the year of the housing purchase and z is the end of the 
ownership life (through sale, catastrophic loss, death of individual, etc.). This range is 
unique to each individual and, therefore, can not be assigned a specific value. 
It is important to recall that the decision to buy a home depends on both costs and 
benefits. In order to keep this model to one equation, costs are treated as negative 
benefits (Area 1 in Figure 1) and are generally apparent in the first year of home 
ownership (Bo). Hence, the first year is negativewhich represents the initial cost incurred 
during this year. In the following years, the sum is, in most cases, positive since benefits 
are expected to exceed costs. By accounting for both the costs and benefits in this 
equation, the result ofthis equation is the net present value of home ownership. Recall 
that the rental curve, RR, is net of rent (or costs). Therefore, the stream of net benefits 
for RR is generally positive, however, it will have little variation as it spans the rental life. 
The difference between the two curves is the incremental net benefits of home ownership 
depicted by the area below the HH curve and above RR (Area 2 in Figure 1). 
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The decision rule developed through the previous calculations is that a prospective 
homeowner should invest in a house if the net present value of the benefits is greater than 
zero. That is: 
Vp (Net Benefits) > 0 
Wealth Constraint 
However, the decision rule is subject to a wealth constraint. An individual will not invest 
in a home ifhe does not have the wealth to do so. To a financial institution, wealth is 
collateral and is necessary to secure a loan or mortgage. Therefore, this decision rule is 
only followed ifan individual has the wealth (ability to receive a loan) to invest in a home. 
A positive present value ofnet benefits leads to a housing investment if and only if an 
individual has the wealth to do so. After considering the wealth constraint, a positive 
value suggests that the present discounted value of the benefits exceeds the present 
discounted value of the costs. Thus, the decision to invest in a house is economically 
rational. Likewise, a negative value means that the costs are greater than the benefits and 
an investment would not be rational. 
Generalizations 
The home ownership model has considerable explanatory power. Three generalizations 
arise from the basic model. All else equal, the longer the stream ofpost-investment 
incremental benefits, the more likely the net present value of an investment in housing will 
be positive. A housing investment made for a shorter period of time will have a lower net 
present value because there are fewer years of positive incremental benefits after the 
8 
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completion of the investment. For example, if an individual has a high mobility rate (tends 
to relocate often), his stream of incremental benefits may be rather short and therefore 
lead to a low or even a negative net present value. I expect older families and married 
families, those with lower mobility rates, to have a higher net present value for a housing 
investment. Next, other things constant, the lower the relative cost of a housing 
investment, the more likely an individual will find that investment profitable. For example, 
when mortgage rates are low, an individual is more likely to invest in housing. Therefore, 
because of the lower relative cost of housing for high income families, these families have 
an increased net present value ofbenefits for home ownership. Finally, other things 
constant, the larger the benefits differential, the more likely an individual will invest in 
housing. If the benefits of home ownership drastically outweigh the costs, then housing 
investment is more likely. Because of their need for space, large families may the find the 
benefits ofhome ownership surpass the costs. 
ill. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The factors affecting home ownership fall into two categories: constraints and net 
benefits. Constraints in the home ownership decision include race, gender and educational 
attainment. The determinants of net benefits include age, marital status and family size. 
Two determinants, net family income and parental home ownership, may affect both 
constraints and net benefits. 
Race. Race is an important factor in home ownership. However, Gyourko and 
Linneman found that housing market discrimination is not the cause of the impact of race 
on the investment decision. Rather, the cause is more likely associated with the increasing 
9 
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cost ofhousing (due to large downpayments, fees and zoning) and the inability of minority 
households to meet the wealth constraint. This is related to the lack of intergenerational 
wealth transfers from their parents, transfers to which white households with similar 
characteristics may have access. Basically, suburban land use policies have raised the cost 
of home ownership and "disproportionately punished members of the middle class whose 
parents cannot transfer wealth for downpayments" (Gyourko and Linneman, 1995). 
Gender. The gender of the head of the household also is a factor in home 
ownership. Given equal incomes, males often have more certain incomes. Certainty of 
income is important with gender because males will, most likely, never leave the 
workforce for such events as child bearing and rearing. Since males are less likely to leave 
the workforce, they have the opportunity to gain more experience in the workforce (by 
working continuously over their work life) and even more with a particular company. 
Therefore, males are more likely to maintain a certain level of income. With more certain 
incomes, males are more likely to secure a loan or mortgage. Thus, they are more willing 
to commit to home ownership. 
Education. The level ofeducational attainment also will determine the home 
ownership decision. An individual with a high level of educational attainment has the 
knowledge of the factors necessary to purchase and maintain a home. Also, an individual 
with more education often saves more ofhis income because he is knowledgeable of 
future living expenses. This increased savings creates the capital and wealth to secure a 
loan. Therefore, he has a greater ability to be approved for a mortgage. Because of this 
link between education and savings, an individual's educational attainment will influence 
his home ownership decision. 
10 
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older households have more certainty of income. As a household gains increasingly more 
experience in the workforce or with a particular company, it is more likely that it will, at 
least, maintain a certain level ofoutcome. In other words, as a household's level of 
experience increases, it is less likely to lose its income altogether in the near future. Thus, 
-
older households are more likely to commit to home ownership. Also, older households 
have more wealth. This means that an investment in housing is more easily diversified and 
a smaller proportion of the wealth of older households contributes toward the housing 
investment. This leads to a preference for home ownership. Finally, older households are 
also less mobile - they tend to relocate less often than younger households. Therefore, 
their annual-equivalent transaction costs are lower which makes home ownership more 
attractive (Haurin, Hederschott and Ling, 1987). 
It is important to realize that there is an offsetting effect. As an individual grows 
older, his prospective ownership life is shorter. This creates a shorter stream ofbenefits . 
that potentially could be negative. However, this study focuses on young adults ranging in 
age from 31 to 39 and is not concerned with the effects of significantly older households 
on the home ownership decision. 
Marital Status. The marital status of an individual also affects home ownership. 
Married couples are often interested in "settling down" and are therefore less mobile than 
unmarried individuals. Less mobility leads to lower annual-equivalent transaction costs in 
a housing purchase and likelihood ofhome ownership. Married couples also pool their 
income and wealth. By pooling their income and wealth, they may be able to cross the 
wealth constraint the prevented home ownership as single individuals. Finally, married 
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couples often forecast a future with children and want to provide a stable environment to 
raise them. With more people in a household, the level ofnet benefits of home ownership 
increases. Hence, married couples are looking to make long term investment decisions 
with their money. With the equity and net benefits that home ownership provides, it is a 
smart investment decision. Therefore, if an individual is married, he has a greater 
-
probability of owning a home. 
Family Size. The next factor in the home ownership decision is the size of a 
family. Past studies have found that the presence of a child in a household has a 
significant positive effect on home ownership (Haurin, Hendershott and Kim, 1992). 
Gyourko and Linneman found a 20% increase in the probability for households with 
children compared to those without children. An increasing number of children yields a 
greater need for home ownership. In fact, buying a home may be less costly (with 
mortgage payments and tax benefits) than renting the space that would accommodate 
larger families. On the other hand, large families are subject to financial constraints that ' 
may prevent home ownership. With more children in the family, the day-to-day expenses 
(food, day care, illnesses, etc.) increase drastically and may not allow for a sizeable 
commitment of income and wealth. However, this study will follow the theory preferred 
in past studies which predicts a higher probability of ownership for households with 
children. 
Net Family Income. The net family income has both a direct and indirect influence 
on the home ownership decision. It is directly related in that as the net income rises within 
a family, the opportunity for home ownership also rises. A higher income has more 
potential to cover the initial costs incurred by home ownership such as securing a 
12 
-mortgage. Income is indirectly related because as income rises, the relative cost of home 
ownership decreases. Given that costs are constant, as income increases, the costs 
become an increasingly smaller proportion of the income. Also, families with a higher 
income are more likely to obtain better financing and more favorable credit conditions. 
This creates greater value of investment in a non-taxed asset for investors in higher income 
brackets (Haurin, Hederschott and Ling, 1987). In both cases, a higher net family income 
should lead to a higher probability ofhome ownership. 
At this point, it is important to discuss the effect of mortgage rates. Although 
theory states that mortgage rates are important, the rates faced by individual respondents 
at the time of their home purchase are not available in this database. However, it is likely 
that if an respondent has a low income, he will face higher mortgage rates and vice versa. 
Therefore, I consider the mortgage rate as factor of the family income variable. A 
respondent with a higher income (and a lower mortgage rate) is more likely to own a 
home. 
Parental Home Ownership. Whether or not the parents of an individual owned a 
house is important to the home ownership decision. First of all, children often look to 
their parents as financial examples. Parental tenure choice may condition the child's home 
ownership decision (DiSalvo and Ermisch, 1997). Second, parents who own homes often 
have a certain level ofwealth which creates intergenerational transfers for their children­
assets and wealth to pass down to future generations. Individuals with lower levels of 
educational attainment and stagnant or declining real incomes often become home owners 
due to better access to intergenerational transfers from their parents (Gyourko and 
Linneman, 1995). Regarding the benefit stream, children ofhomeowners are aware of the 
13 
costs and benefits associated with home ownership and, thus, more able to accurately 
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assess the net benefits ofhome ownership. Therefore, for both reasons, if the parents own 
a home then their children also are more likely to own a home as well. 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This section presents the estimate ofa single-equation logistic model of the probability of 
home ownership in 1996. Since this study seeks to relate the fraction ofhomeowners to 
its determinants, a logistic model allows the dependent variable to remain within the range 
[0, 1] where 1 denotes home ownership while 0 is non-home ownership. (Ramanathan, 
1998). This model will predict a probability of home ownership. 
The data used for this study are obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) focusing on the 1996 panel ofyoung adults (ages 31to 39), the most 
recent survey year. This database is appropriate because it includes data describing a 
respondent's demographic characteristics, earning experiences, wealth and housing 
choices. From the possible 12,675 respondents, 4050 had dropped out of the survey by 
1996. Ofthe remaining cases, 2741 were rejected due to missing data leaving a healthy 
sample size of 5884. 
The dependent variable is represented by a dummy variable distinguishing between 
homeowners (1) and non-home owners (0) in 1996. The following independent variables 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Race (WlllTE) is depicted as a dummy variable. A white (1) individual is 
expected to have a higher probability ofowning a house than a black or Hispanic 
individual (0) due to 
14
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TABLE 1:
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION EXPECTED 
VALUE 
HOME 
OWNER 
MEAN 
NON-HOME 
OWNER 
MEAN 
WlllTE 
-
1 = White 
0== Other 
+ 0.64 0.35 
MALE 1 == Male 
0== Female 
+ 0.54 0.45 
EDUCATION Highest grade completed by 
respondent as of 1996 
+ 13.51 12.53 
AGE Age of respondent in 1996 + 34.79 34.37 
MARRIED 1 = Married, widowed or separated 
o== Single or divorced (as of 1996) 
+ 0.78 0.30 
FAMSIZE Number of people in the 
respondent's family in 1996 
+ 3.53 3.06 
FAMINCOME Net income of respondent's family 
as of 1996 
+ 84019.83 35060.76 
PARENT Educational attainment of 
respondent's father as of 1996 
+ 11.28 10.48 
access to intergenerational transfers. Therefore, I expect the coefficient of this variable to 
be positive. 
The gender (MALE) of a respondent is designated by a dummy variable where a 
male is 1 and a female is O. Since the theory in this study suggests higher ownership 
probabilities for males, this variable's coefficient should be positive. 
The educational attainment (EDUCATION) of an individual is the highest grade 
completed by that individual, ranging from no education to doctorate levels. As the level 
ofeducation increases for an individual, so does his probability of home ownership. 
Hence, I expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
15 
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Age (AGE) is represented by the actual age of the respondent. I expect this 
coefficient to be positive. As an individual grows older, his home ownership probability 
increases. Because the respondents in this survey ranged in age from 31 to 39, the effect 
of a wide variety of ages can not be tested. 
The marital status (MARRIED) of an individual also is a dummy variable. Theory 
suggests that married individuals (1) are more likely to own a home than single individuals 
(0). For simplicity, divorcees are designated as single individuals and widows and 
separated individuals are placed in the married category. Of course this assumes that 
existing home ownership is deprived ofboth individuals in divorce settlements and widows 
retain the home even after the death of a spouse. In times of separation, it is assumed that 
the couple still owns the home (still has the deed) even though one spouse may not be 
living there. These assumptions are generally true~ therefore this categorization is 
adequate in measuring the effects of marriage on home ownership. Hence, the coefficient 
of marital status should be positive. 
The family size (FAMSIZE) variable consists of the number of people in the 
respondent's family, ranging from one to 13. As the family size increases, the probability 
of home ownership should increase as well. Thus, I expect a positive coefficient for this 
variable. 
Net family income (FAMINCOME) is represented by the actual net income of the 
respondent in 1996. Based on the theory in the previous section, I expect the coefficient 
to be positive. As the net family income of an individual increases, it is more likely that he 
will own a house. 
16
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Parental home ownership status is not available through the NLSY. Assuming that 
there is a strong relationship between home ownership and the educational attainment of 
the respondent's father, I use the father's education (PARENT) as a proxy for the parent's 
home ownership status (Haurin, Hendershott and Kim, 1992). Considering the theory 
from the previous section, as the highest grade completed by the father increases, the child 
is more likely to own a home. This variable should have a positive coefficient. 
The theory of the previous section and the definitions of the variables result in the 
following model: 
In [P/(l-P)] = a. + ~lWHITE + ~2MALE + ~3EDUCATION + ~4AGE + 
~sMARRIED + ~6F AMSIZE + ~7FAMINCOME + ~8P ARENT + J.1 
where P is the probability of home ownership. 
v. RESULTS 
Regression Results 
Overall, the model performed well. The results are displayed in Table 2 where Model A is 
the original model as described in the previous section. 
All variables except PARENT and FAMSIZE are highly significant, most to the 0.0005 
level, with the expected sign. Gender and marital status have the strongest effects, these 
variables will have rather significant effects on the home ownership decision. Even though 
the results ofFAMINCOME is positive and highly significant, the coefficient is extremely 
small. Therefore, this variable will probably have the smallest effect on the probability of 
home ownership. 
17
 
-PARENT did not have the expected sign. Remember from earlier discussion that 
father's educational attainment is used as a proxy for parental home ownership in this 
model. Theoretically, this variable should have a positive effect; the higher the education 
TABLE 2: 
REGRESSION RESULTS
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: HOME OWNERSHIP
 
VARIABLE EXPECTED 
VALUE 
MODEL A MODELB 
WlllTE + 0.8917*** 0.8901*** 
MALE + 0.2558** 0.2405*** 
EDUCATION + 0.1068*** 0.1074*** 
AGE + 0.0764*** 0.0763*** 
MARRIED + 1.8152*** 1.17165*** 
FAMSIZE + -.0243 0.1027* 
FAMSIZE5 
- -
-0.1048*** 
FAMINCOME + 2.52 x 10"-6*** 2.53 x 10"-6*" 
PARENT + -0.0363*** -0.0369*** 
N 
-
5884 5884 
* Significant at .05 level 
** Significant at .0001 level 
*** Significant at .00005 level 
level of the father, the more likely the child will own a home. However, its negative 
coefficient and high level of significance suggests otherwise. The model indicates that the 
probability ofan individual owning a home decreases if his parents owned a home. 
18 
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detennine if this background variable is working through intervening variables. In 
particular, I wanted to see ifPARENT is actually working through FAMINCOME and 
EDUCATION to detennine the probability of home ownership. It is possible that the 
variable's indirect effects through the homeowner's own education and income offset the 
direct effect measured by PARENT. Generally, the results show father's education does 
have strong indirect effects through FAMINCOME and EDUCATION which offset the 
unexpected direct effect measured by the estimated value ofPARENT in Model A. 
Therefore, when indirect effects are taken into account, it does not appear that the father's 
educational attainment has a significant effect on the probability of home ownership. 
However, since father's education is actually a proxy for parental home ownership, it is 
possible that it is simply an insufficient proxy and that future research should address this 
issue. Details of this analysis are presented in Appendix A. 
The coefficient ofFAMSIZE in Model A is not significant. According to theory, 
as the size of a family grows larger, the probability that the head of the household owns a 
home increases. Because of its lack of significance, FAMSIZE suggests that the theory is 
not correct. After close examination of the data I discovered that as the size of a family 
exceeds four, fewer families actually own their home. With this in mind, I consider the 
opposing family size theory briefly mentioned in the theory section. This states that the 
probability of home ownership increases with family size up to a certain point (four people 
in this study) then decreases as family size increases after this point. This is mainly due to 
the fact that as the number of people in a family increases, the costs within that family 
increase as well. Thus, even with a high value of net benefits, larger families are subject to 
19 
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a wealth constraint that does not allow them to invest in a home. Therefore, I create an 
interaction effect, FAMSIZE5, between FAMSIZE and a dummy variable DUMMYFs to 
test the difference in family size. The DUMMYFS variable is 1 for families of five or more 
people and 0 for families smaller than five people. From this interaction, FAMSIZE5 
represents the additional effect of families of five or more offamily size on the home 
ownership decision. Including this variable, Model B is: 
In [P/(l-P)] = a. + ~lwmTE + ~2MALE + ~3EDUCATION + ~4AGE + 
~sMARRIED + ~6FAMSIZE + ~7FAMSIZE5+ ~sFAMlNCOM + ~~ARENT + Il 
where FAMSIZE5 =FAMSIZE x DUMMYFS. 
When an individual has a family smaller than five people, the FAMSIZE5 variable drops 
out of the model (because DUMMYFS is 0 when FAMSIZE is less than 5). Thus, ~6 is the 
sole effect of family size on the home ownership decision. However, when the size of a 
family is five or more, ~ 6+ ~ 7is the additive effect offamily size on home ownership. 
When regressed in Model B, FAMSIZE has a significant, positive coefficient while 
the coefficient for FAMSIZE5 proved to be negative and highly significant. However, 
because of the values of the coefficients ofFAMSIZE and FAMSIZE5, the variables do 
not quite act according to the new theory. Since the coefficient ofFAMSIZE is 0.1027 
and the coefficient for FAMSIZE5 is -0.1048, the additive effect of the two variables is ­
0.0021, a small negative. Since this result is so small, these variables essentially have an 
offsetting effect rather than the negative effect on the probability ofhome ownership as 
20 
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suggested by the theory. To illustrate this point, consider a family that increases from 
three to four members. The effect of this change is P6. However, when a family size 
increase from six to seven members, the effect, P 6 + P7 (0.1027 + - 0.1048), is 
approximately zero. Therefore, once the size of the family reaches five members, an 
increase in family size has essentially no effect on the probability ofhome ownership. 
Thus, the family size theory used in Model B accounts for the insignificance ofFAMSIZE 
in Model A. 
Even though the adjusted variables perform better in Model B, overall both models 
perform similarly when used to predict home ownership. To obtain the error rate for 
Models A and B, I use each model's respective coefficients and the actual values for the 
variables representing each respondent's characteristics to estimate the probability of 
home ownership for each respondent. If the estimate is greater than or equal to 0.50, this 
denotes a value of one, which predicts a homeowner. Likewise, when the estimate is less 
that 0.50, this represents a zero value and a non-home owner. When this procedure is 
carried out through for each respondent, each models' predictions are correct 
approximately 74 percent of the time which signifies a 26 percent error rate. 
Simulation Results 
Since I use a logistic model in this study, the results determined in the regression are not 
slopes of a line as in the standard OLS model and, therefore, can not be interpreted in the 
same manner. Instead, the results will be interpreted by conducting a set of simulations. 
Each simulation assumes a specific set ofcharacteristics for a hypothetical individual and 
then uses the estimated logistic equation to estimate the probability of home ownership for 
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that individual. In this study, the mean values of each determinant are used except in the 
case of dummy variables, where a specific value is assigned (1 or 0). By using 
simulations, I can demonstrate the effect of a change in one variable on the probability of 
home ownership. Table 2 provides the coefficient and mean for each variable which aid in 
the interpretation of the results. By substituting the respective coefficients and means for 
each variable, the effects of each variable are interpreted. 
The first four simulations look at the differences in probability of home ownership 
among four groups: married white males single white males married black males and 
single black males. The simulation values used for the first four hypothetical individuals 
are displayed in Table 3. In the first two simulations, a married, white male with a college 
degree and the age, family income, family size and father's education equal to the sample 
mean has almost a 32 percentage point greater probability of owning a house than his 
single counterpart. Simulations 3 and 4 reveal that a black male with the same 
TABLE 3:
 
SIMULATION RESULTS: MARRIAGE AND RACE
 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
(P,,) 
MEAN SIM.l 
Married, 
white male 
SIM.2 
SIn&1e, 
whitemaJe 
SIM.3 
Married, 
blackmaJe 
SIM.4 
SIn&1e, 
blackmaJe 
WlllTE 0.8901 0.58 1 1 0 0 
MALE 0.2405 0.50 1 1 1 1 
EDUCATION 0.1074 13.33 16 16 16 16 
AGE 0.0763 34.61 34.61 34.61 34.61 34.61 
MARRIED 1.7165 0.61 1 0 1 0 
FAMSIZE 0.1027 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 
FAMSIZE5 -0.1048 5.608 0 0 0 0 
FAMINCOME 2.53 x 10"-6 65444.51 65444.51 65444.51 65444.1 65444.1 
PARENT -0.0369 11.00 11 11 11 11 
PROBABILITY - - 87.65% . 56.05% 74.45% 34.37% 
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characteristics has a 41 percentage point increase in the probability of owning a home if he 
is married rather than single. Although not displayed in the table, I also look at the effects 
of marriage on females. A single, black female with a college degree and no children, and 
the age, family income and father's education equal to the sample mean experiences a 40 
percentage point increase in the probability of home ownership just by getting married. 
Because of these results, I can conclude that marital status is very important in 
determining the probability of home ownership. 
A comparison of the four simulations in Table 3 also explores the difference in 
probability of home ownership according to race. Simulations 1 and 3 indicate that a 
white, married male is 13 percentage points more likely to own a home than a black 
married male while the second and fourth simulations denote that a single, white male has 
a 22 percentage point greater probability of home ownership than his minority 
counterpart. 
Although not displayed in the table, I also run simulations that look at changes in 
income and its effect on home ownership. By varying the mean income of several 
different hypothetical individuals, I discover that even a rather large change in income had 
a small effect on the probability of home ownership. For example, a married, black 
female, with all other variables equal to the sample mean, experienced a one percentage 
point increase in her probability of home ownership when her income increased by 
$20,000. Similarly, a $20,000 decrease in her income decreased her probability by one 
percentage point. These changes in family income had comparable results for all 
hypothetical individuals used in this simulation. 
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This paper examines the determinants ofhome ownership. Most of the results of this 
paper are consistent with the findings ofprevious studies as well as my theory. The results 
of each variable generally support past research with two exceptions, family size and 
parental home ownership. Race, gender, education, age and marital status proved to have 
significant and positive effects. Therefore, a married, white male with two children has a 
strong probability of home ownership. Increasing age, income and education further 
increase this individual's home ownership prospects. 
The major contribution of this study is the refinement of the relationship between 
family size and home ownership in the original model. The insignificance ofthe family size 
variable led to the exploration ofan alternate theory concerning its impact on home 
ownership. This theory states that the probability ofhome ownership increases as family 
size increases up to a certain level at which the probability remains at approximately the 
same level as family size continues to increase. In this study, the change occurred as 
families grew from four to five people. Up to four people, increases in family size increase 
the probability of home ownership. After this point, increases in family size have no effect 
on home ownership. 
An unexpected result in this study is the negative yet significant coefficient ofthe 
proxy for parental home ownership in the original model. However, after exploration of 
the indirect effects of this variable in Appendix A, PARENT proves to have little effect on 
the home ownership decision rather than the counterintuitive effect suggested by the 
regression results ofthis variable. 
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However, the results of this study, namely the 26% error rate, leave plenty of room 
for future research. First of all, this model may be lacking important variables. Perhaps a 
location variable (urban or rural) or a cost of housing measure could decrease the error 
rate. Because of the cost ofurban living, many city dwellers may be lifetime renters 
because they are unable to meet the initial cost of home ownership. However, those who 
live in rural areas may be able to afford a home at a fairly young age because of the low 
cost of ownership. Second, it would be beneficial to find another proxy for parental home 
ownership- or perhaps the measure itself The significant, negative coefficient did not act 
according to theory. Appendix A shows that the father's level of educational attainment 
was not the appropriate proxy for this measure. Also, constraints are very important to 
this model. It would be interesting to look at various wealth constraints and their effects 
on the model. Finally, since this study looked at the microeconomic aspect of home 
ownership, it would be interesting to employ these results in a macroeconomic aspect of 
housing. The effect of the determinants of home ownership on the housing markets and 
the wider economy may be a starting point. 
As far as policy implications are concerned, I can only suggest housing loan 
programs that cater to these variables. More specifically, loans that assist minority as well 
as large families would be beneficial. From past literature and as proven by this paper, it is 
apparent that minority families may need assistance due to the lack of intergenerational 
transfers. Because of high initial costs of home ownership, minority families may have a 
difficult time meeting the wealth constraint without the assistance of intergenerational 
transfers or a housing loan. From this study, it is evident that large families would benefit 
from home ownership assistance as well. As families become larger and larger, many are 
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unable to meet the wealth constraint ofhome ownership due to increasing family costs. 
However, because of the size of the family, these families often have a high level of net 
benefits for home ownership. Therefore, with loan assistance, these families would be able 
to meet the wealth constraint for home ownership and obtain their expected level of net 
benefits of ownership. 
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The effects of father's education, the proxy for parental home ownership, on the 
probability ofhome ownership are explored in this section. For the analysis of this 
variable, three paths are explored. These paths are shown schematically in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: 
EFFECTS OF PARENT VARIABLE 
IEDUCATION I 
D;.;IRE;.....,....;C;..T_E....;F_"F,.;;;"E;",,;C-T- .~ HOME 
PARENT OWNERSHIPI I 
IFAMINCOME I 
The first path is the direct effect of father's education on the probability of home 
ownership. This is the effect of the father's level of educational attainment when 
measured as a determinant ofhome ownership. As a factor in Models A and B, this proxy 
proves to be negative yet significant. This suggests that the respondent's probability for 
home ownership actually decreases as the level of the father's education increases. The 
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next step is to explore the indirect paths of between father's education on home ownership 
must be explored. It could be that the unexpected direct effect of this variable is offset by 
its indirect effects. 
The first indirect path measures father's education effect on the probability of home 
ownership through the respondent's education (the top portion ofFigure 2). As the 
father's level of education increases, the respondent'~ own education increases. Model C 
in Table 4 displays the OLS regression performed between these two variables and reveals 
a highly significant coefficient of 0.258. This means that as the father's level of 
educational attainment increases by one year, his child's education increases by 0.258 
years. In tum, a 0.258 increase in the child's education has a positive effect on the 
probability of home ownership. 
TABLE 4:
 
INTERVENING VARIABLE REGRESSION RESULTS
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
MODELe 
Dependent - EDUCATION 
MODELD 
Dependent - FAMINCOME 
PARENT 0.258*** 5685.494*** 
Constant 10.382 2920.504 
R Square 0.171 0.024 
N 5884 5884 
*** Significant at .00005 level 
The indirect effect offather's education on the probability of home ownership also 
is measured through the net family income. This effect looks into the idea that as the 
father's level of educational attainment increases, his child's family income will increase as 
well. An OLS regression (Model D in Table 4) reveals that father's education and the 
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respondent's net family income also are significantly related. As the father's level of 
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educational attainment increases by one year, his child's net family income increases by 
$5685.49. When this additional $5685.49 is applied to the respondent's income, it 
increases his probability of home ownership. 
Because of the strong relationships between father's education and the 
respondent's education as well as father's education and the respondent's net family 
income, PARENT is more closely associated with EDUCATION and FAMINCOME than 
the probability of home ownership. Therefore, PARENT may be an insufficient proxy for 
parental home ownership. I use the simulation process to look at the combined direct and 
indirect effects ofPARENT on the probability ofhome ownership. 
To combine the three effects, I use the values in Models C and D as well as the 
original coefficients from Model B in the simulation. Using the mean values for each 
determinant to create a hypothetical individual, the simulation using only the coefficients 
from Model B finds that this hypothetical individual has a 62.47% probability of owning a 
home. However, to analyze the indirect effects ofPARENT, the new values must be 
integrated into the simulation. Therefore, the new coefficients ofEDUCATION and 
FAMINCOME are added to the means. The simulation is monitoring the effects of a one 
year increase in the father's education so one year will be added to the mean value of 
father's education, increasing it from 11 to 12 years. Since a one year increase in 
PARENT increases EDUCATION by 0.258 years, 0.258 must be added to the mean value 
ofEDUCATION. Likewise, a one year increase in PARENT leads to a $5685.49 increase 
in FAMINCOME and therefore, $5685.49 must be added to the mean value of 
FAMINCOME. When the simulation is reevaluated with the new values, the hypothetical 
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individual has a 62.59% probability of owning a home. However, this value is essentially 
the same as the 62.47% probability found in the first simulation. This means that there is 
an offsetting effect between the direct and indirect effects. This effects essentially cancel 
each other out. Therefore, because of the offsetting effects between the direct and indirect 
paths, PARENT has very little overall effect on the probability ofhome ownership. 
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